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carta_philus

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  • Mental action again: How can you explain remembering with an intentionalist framework?

    I´ve just asked a question about mental actions and I received an answer that claimed that the best way to characterize what the mind do is appealing to intentions. And he was citing Dennett.

    I would really like to know more about how can you explain cognitive phenomena as remembering from an intentionalist view. Mele (2009) for example, argue that remembering cannot be explained by an intention to remember because remembering is not something that you can intend to do, like sneezing. It is a non-action. Mele himself have developped a little account of mental actions where he distinguish to mental actions from volitions. A volition is a dark concept. On the other hand a mental action can be understood as a process or event that aims a change in the mind (i.e. by its goal). It may be an epistemic, motivational change.

    I haven´t read everything of Dennett, but I found very interesting one of his papers on this, which is comprised in Brainstroms.

    1 AnswerPhilosophy1 decade ago
  • Is remembering a mental action? Or is it just an automatic process?

    I´m asking this question because I´m intersted on the debate about the existence of Mental Actions. Some philosphers accept that there are mental actions, while other deny their existence.

    YES: we can understand thinking in terms of action.

    (O’Brien & Soteriou 2009; Proust 2009; Peacocke 2008; Campbell 2002) Remembering, calculating, judging, deciding, solving a chess problem in the mind are all mental actions.

    NO: it is just a way of talking and most of these mental events just happen to us; they are not intentionally carried out.

    (Ruben, 1995; Strawson 2003; Carruthers 2009)

    4 AnswersPhilosophy1 decade ago
  • How to individuate an action?

    Goldman (1970)Fine-grained account: “It treats actions A and B as different actions if, in performing them, the agent exemplifies different act-properties”. “Goldman understand an act property as ‘a property such that at least one of its instances is an act-token’” (16).

    4 actions  Switching, turning on the light, illuminating the room, alerting the prowler are actions since act-properties are different.

    Davidson’s (1980) Coarse grained account: “action (…) require[s] that what the agent does is intentional under some description” (50). “a man is the agent of an act if what he does can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional” (46).

    1 AnswerPhilosophy1 decade ago
  • What is a feeling? Philosohically what do you think is the best account of what a feeling is?

    The metaphysical and epistemological debate on what a feeling is is still open. I will like to read some opinions and some arguments against and for.

    2 AnswersPhilosophy1 decade ago
  • Is metacognition a conscious process?

    Ambiguity of “conscious”:

    a) Conscious of the content of the attitude?

    b) Conscious of the activity?

    c) Conscious of the evaluation?

    d) Conscious of controlling the action?

    e) Conscious of the self?

    Some experimental work suggests that it may be an implicit process. Kelley & (Jacoby 1996; Reder & Schunn 1996;

    Paynter, Reder & Kiefaber 2009)

    1 AnswerPsychology1 decade ago
  • 1) Is there some sort of events in the mind that we can properly call mental actions? EX: remembering?

    1) Is there some sort of events in the mind that we can properly call mental actions?

    EX: Is trying to remember my aunt’s telephone number a mental action?

    2) What conditions should these mental events satisfy to qualify for actions?

    Some philosophers have answered to these questions:

    YES: we can understand thinking in terms of action.

    (O’Brien & Soteriou 2009; Proust 2009; Peacocke 2008; Campbell 2002). Thus, Remembering, calculating, judging, deciding, solving a chess problem in the mind are all mental actions.

    NO: it is just a way of talking and most of these mental events just happen to us; they are not intentionally carried out.

    (Ruben, 1995; Strawson 2003; Carruthers 2009)

    1 AnswerPhilosophy1 decade ago