Is remembering a mental action? Or is it just an automatic process?

Question

I´m asking this question because I´m intersted on the debate about the existence of Mental Actions. Some philosphers accept that there are mental actions, while other deny their existence.

YES: we can understand thinking in terms of action.
(O’Brien & Soteriou 2009; Proust 2009; Peacocke 2008; Campbell 2002) Remembering, calculating, judging, deciding, solving a chess problem in the mind are all mental actions.

NO: it is just a way of talking and most of these mental events just happen to us; they are not intentionally carried out.
(Ruben, 1995; Strawson 2003; Carruthers 2009)

Answer 1

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...truly - worth ones consideration at least - mentally of course!...

Answer 2

Your brain knows what you want even when your unsure. Your brain. Also chooses what you want to remember if you don't want to remember something then you won't. I guantee there are plenty of things you don't remember either good of bad because there pointless but if something has meaning then there was a reason you remembered because your past builds you up for the future. You learn from mistakes and the choices you made good or bad.

Answer 3

Now days philosophers as well as cognitive scientists prefer to talk about "intentions" instead of will or mental action. They are all metaphors but the concept of intentions is more useful and thus more meaningful to the modern mind. So the important issue is not whether they exist but whether they are descriptive enough of what is happening to be useful.

Intentions are the highest level of a description of an agent and are easier to tie to actions, choices, and behavior. If you read Daniel Dennett, for example, you will find him working at the intention level.

Answer 4

The above contains a misunderstanding of Dennett. Intentionality and Intending are not the same thing.

This question curiously assumes that automatic processes are not mental actions. I don't see why such a position should have to be held. After all, having a certain desire might not be something someone does intentionally, but the propositional attitude "desires that" could certainly be counted among someone's mental states. Having a belief that it is raining when one is standing in the rain does not seem to be voluntary, but having the propositional attitude of believing that it is raining is no less a mental state, and having a desire to remain dry doesn't seem like something we have to expend any mental effort to conjure up, and having the belief that we have an umbrella, and having a belief that opening the umbrella will keep us dry are similarly devoid of any special mental effort, yet they all explain why we, of our own free will (that is, intentionally) open the umbrella. If any of Dennett's work is relevant to this part of the question, it is his work in compatibilism.

Additionally, there is a question of whether all cases of remembering have the same phenomenological flavor. Certainly in my own experience (and I would expect it to be similar to others) sometimes memories pop wholly unbidden to my notice, and these seem like unintentional happenings if anything my mind does is unintentional. However, sometimes I expend a great deal of effort to remember certain things, sometimes even going through old notes, or using mnemonic devices, or trying to remember related things, or asking other persons about what I'm trying to remember. This is an intentional action if anything I do is intentional.

See the sources on my other answer, this will help you get clearer about what you're looking for.